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Abstract: We investigate the stationarity of real exchange rates using a panel of
Asian and South and Latin American countries by applying a new panel unit root
test that is robust to structural breaks due to currency crises. It turns out that
the long-run PPP relationship is relevant for the Asian countries, which experi-
enced a ﬂexible exchange rate, whereas for the South and Latin American coun-
tries, for which the exchange rate has been pegged to the U.S. dollar for a long
time, the PPP relationship breaks down. In Asian countries PPP appears to hold
before the 1997 crisis, which is not the case for the South and Latin American
countries. This suggests that the “Asian ﬂu” corresponds to a second-generation
type of crises, whereas the 1995 “Mexican tequila” ﬁts the ﬁrst-generation models
better. JEL no. C13, C33, E41
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1 Introduction
Formanyyears,theempiricalanalysisofthepurchasingpowerparity(PPP)
has constituted an active research area. In this literature the equilibrium
exchange rate is often associated with an international version of the law
of one price. The standard approach to testing for an equilibrium real
exchange rate is to apply unit root tests such as the one suggested by Dickey
and Fuller (1979). If the test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the logarithm of real exchange rate, then deviations of the PPP
relationship are considered to be permanent. Applying such tests to post-
1973datarevealshoweverlittlesupportforthePPPparadigm.Papell(1997)
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argues that this ﬁnding may be due to the lack of power of traditional
tests in small samples (see also Taylor 2002). On the other hand, tests
based on century data (e.g., Frankel 1986; Lothian and Taylor 1996) do not
provide unambiguous results in favor of the PPP, as they mix up different
exchange rate regimes. Papell (2002) and Zumaquero and Urrea (2002)
propose to account for structural breaks that represent exceptional events
such as regime change. For example, Zumaquero and Urrea (2002) employ
bivariate systems of European countries and locate three different breaks
associated with the oil shock, the beginning of the European Monetary
System (EMS), and the general crisis of the EMS in 1992. On the other
hand, Papell (2002) models the appreciation and then the depreciation of
thedollarinthe1980sasshiftsinthedeterministiccomponentsoftheseries.
In both cases, the evidence of stationaryr e a le x c h a n g er a t ei sc o n s i d e r a b l y
increased.
In general, the balance of nominal exchange rates and relative prices is
considered to be a long-term phenomenon, while various types of rigidi-
ties can distort the PPP relationship in the short run. Accordingly, the
empirical methodology focuses on the long-run (cointegration) link be-
tween exchange rates and relative prices. The most natural way to test
the PPP relationship empirically is to t e s tt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ef o rs t a -
tionarity. Such a test assumes a strict proportionality between the nom-
inal exchange rates and relative prices. However, the long-run relation-
ship between nominal exchange rates and relative prices is not necessarily
strictly proportional. This weaker form of the PPP relationship can be
investigated using a cointegration framework due to Engle and Granger
(1987) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). Using both approaches, empiri-
cal studies ﬁnd some support for a long-run PPP relationship (Taylor and
McMahon 1988; Johnson 1990; Kim 1990; Fisher and Park 1991; Zuma-
quero and Urrea 2002), but the evidence is far from being overwhelm-
ing.
The recent development of the panel data techniques has challenged
the traditional time series approach, principally because it requires fewer
time series observations. Therefore, using panel data it is possible to focus
on relative short time spans with homogenous exchange rate regimes. In
recentyearspanel data variantsoftests for unit rootandcointegration have
been developed (e.g., Breitung and Meyer 1994; Im et al. 2003; Levin et
al. 2002; Pedroni 2001). These methods have been applied to the free-ﬂoat
period of OECD countries, providing some support for a long-run PPP
relationship (Wu 1996; Meier 1997; Anker 1999;Flores et al. 1999).For less126 Review of World Economics 2005, Vol. 141 (1)
developed countries, however, the evidence for a stable PPP relationship is
much weaker (Boyd and Smith 1999).
An important problem with the application of unit root test to Asian
and South and Latin American countries is the emergence of severe cur-
rency crises which are characterized by dramatic changes in the nominal
exchange rates. To account for these extraordinary events, we extend the
panel unit root test procedure to accommodate structural breaks in the
relationshipbetween exchangeratesandrelativeprices. Wesuggestasimple
test procedure which is robust to such structural breaks. Our test is applied
to a panel of countries in South and Latin America and Asia. This choice
is motivated by the fact that these countries have experienced major cur-
rency crises (the 1994 “tequila” crisis and the 1997 “Asian ﬂu”). These two
groups of countries have experienced two different types of exchange rate
regimes before the crises: In South and Latin American countries curren-
cies were ﬁxed, i.e., pegged to the U.S. dollar, whereas in Asia currencies
were free to ﬂoat. Our ﬁnding that there exists a long-run PPP relationship
for Asian countries but not for South and Latin American countries has
several important implications. It indicates that in Asian countries a cur-
rencycrisis doesnotaffectpermanentlythelinkbetween nominalexchange
rates and relative prices. Accordingly, for these countries PPP long-run
equilibrium is a useful benchmark when assessing an exchange rate mis-
alignment. For Asian countries, a measure of implied deviations from PPP
may serve as an indicator to assess the risk of a currency crisis (e.g., Chinn
1999).
Finally, the analysis of the stability of the PPP relationship for each
subgroup of countries helps characterizing the currency crises. The ﬁnd-
ing that PPP is violated when the crisis periods are removed, suggests
that real exchange rates were inappropriate because of inadequate eco-
nomic policy (as it is expected by ﬁrst-generation models). However, if
PPP is accepted outside the crises, it would be in line with the second
generation of currency crises models, which stress the importance of non-
fundamentals (e.g., self-fulﬁlling prophecies or contagion) during a specu-
lative attack.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a panel unit root test is
suggested thatisvalidinthepresenceofstructuralbreaks.Theﬁnitesample
properties of our new test is studied in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
details of our data. In Section 5 we present the results of various unit root
tests for the real exchange rate in our panel of Asian as well as South and
Latin American countries. Section 5 concludes.Breitung/Candelon: Purchasing Power Parity during Currency Crises 127
2 Panel Unit Root Tests under Structural Breaks
If deviations from the PPP relationship are transitory, then the conditional
expectation of the long-run real exchange rate, yt, tends to zero, i.e.,
lim
h→∞
E(yt+h|It) = 0, (1)
where It is the information available at time t. Accordingly, shocks to the
real exchange rate disappear as the time horizon increases and, therefore,
theautoregressiverepresentationofyt must nothaveaunitroot.Totestthis
hypothesis, panel unit root tests were applied by Frankel and Rose (1996b),
Papell(1997),CoakleyandFuertes(1997),O’Connell(1998),Anker(1999),
BoydandSmith(1999),tonamebutafew.Animportantproblemwithsuch
tests is that if real exchange rates are subject to structural breaks, then large
and permanent devaluations of the currencies during a currency crisis will
biasthetesttowardacceptanceoftheunitroothypothesis. Toovercomethis
problem, Perron (1989) accounted for structural breaks in the time series
process by including dummy variables.
Unfortunately, the panel unit root test procedures suggested by Levin
et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) cannot be modiﬁed easily by including
dummy variables if the break periods differ across countries. Both tests
depend on expressions of the asymptotic mean and variances of the test
statistic, which arefunctions of the dates of the structuralbreaks. Inprinci-
ple,thelimitingdistributioncanbesimulatedgiventheactualbreakdatesin
thesample. Amoreconvenientapproachis, however,toapplyatest statistic
with a limiting distribution not depending on the country-speciﬁc break
dates.
To obtain such a test statistic, we follow Breitung and Meyer (1994)and
Breitung (2000) by constructing a test statistic that is not subject to the
so-called Nickell bias. Accordingly, no tables for the mean and variance of
the test statistic are required and the test statistic has the standard normal
limitingdistributionasthenumberofcross-sectionunitsN andthenumber
of time periods T tend to inﬁnity. Furthermore, the limiting distribution
does not depend on the number and time of the structural breaks.
Assume for convenience that the real exchange rates, yit,h a v eaﬁ n i t e
autoregressive representation with an individual speciﬁc mean:
∆yi,t = µi + φyi,t−1 + γi,1∆yi,t−1 +···+γi,p∆yi,t−p + εi,t,
t = p + 2,...,T , (2)128 Review of World Economics 2005, Vol. 141 (1)
where the initial value, yi,0, is bounded in probability for all i.L e v i ne ta l .
(2002) show that the t-statistic of the hypothesis φ = 0 does not possess
a standard normal limiting distribution and involves a negative expecta-
tion decreasing with N. This is due to the so-called Nickell bias resulting
from the correlation between the mean-adjusted lagged difference and the
error, εi,t. Furthermore, the value of the bias (and variance) of the test
statistic is affected by including further deterministic terms like a time
trend or dummy variables. To overcome this problem, Breitung and Meyer
(1994) suggest adjusting for the individual speciﬁc mean by subtracting
the ﬁrst observation, yi,1,i n s t e a do ft h em e a n¯ yi, so that the test regres-
sion is:
∆yi,t = φ(yi,t−1 − yi,1) + γi,1∆yi,t−1 +···
+ γi,p∆yi,t−p + ei,t . (3)
This transformation can be motivated by the fact that under the null hy-
pothesistheparameterµi isestimated bytheﬁrstobservation(Schmidtand
Phillips 1992).
If the individual speciﬁc effects aresubject to structural breaks, then the
mean of ∆yi,t is time dependent. For notational convenience assume that
thereisasinglestructuralbreakatperiodSiineachcountry.Ageneralization
to multiple structural breaks is straightforward.
To account for segmented mean function we estimate the subsample
means of t ∈{ p + 2,...,Si} and t ∈{ Si + 1,...,T} by the ﬁrst observations




yi,1 for t ∈{ 1,...,Si}
yi,S+1 for t ∈{ Si + 1,...,T}. (4)
Using this segmented mean function, the regression function (3) becomes
∆yi,t = φ(yi,t−1 −mi,t)+γi,1∆yi,t−1 +···+γi,p−1∆yi,t−p+1 +ei,t
for t = p + 3,...,Si,Si + p + 3,...,T. In this regression the equations for
t ∈{ Si + 1,...,Si + p + 2} are dropped, because no mean adjustment is
available for these time periods. Under the null hypothesis φ = 0i tf o l -
lows that E[ei,t(yi,t−1 − mi,t)]=0f o ra l li and t. Thus, a test based on the
t-statistic of ρ = 1 has a standard normal limiting distribution asN →∞ ,
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This is an attractive feature of our test because we do not need to as-
sume that the numbers of time periods in the two regimes tend to inﬁn-
ity.1
3 Small-Sample Properties
To investigate the small-sample behavior of the unit root tests suggested in
the previous section, a Monte Carlo experiment is performed. The data is
generated as
yi,t = γdi,t + ui,t (5)
ui,t = ρui,t−1 + εi,t , (6)
where εi,t ∼ N(0,σ2) and
di,t =

0f o r t < Si
1f o r t ≥ Si . (7)
The parameter γ measures the importance of the structural break. In our
experiment we set γ = 3. Under the null hypothesis we let ρ = 1, and to
study thepower welet ρ = 0.9.Forreasonsofspace, weonlypresentresults
for Si = T/2f o ra l li.
Under the null hypothesis the change in the mean function results in
an outlier in the differenced series. Therefore, we expect that for all tests
the actual size approaches 0.05 as N →∞and T →∞ .H o w e v e r ,i nﬁ n i t e
samples there might be important size distortions due to the deterministic
outlier at the structural break date.
Table 1 presents the rejection frequencies for various numbers of time
periods. All rejection frequencies are based on 10,000 replications, and
a nominal signiﬁcance level of 0.05 is used. The tests without allowing for
a structural break are reported in the columns LL (Levin et al. 2002) and
IPS(Imet al.2003).Theresults ofthe test allowing forstructuralbreaksare
presented in the column BREAK.
FromtheresultsreportedinTable1itisobviousthatignoringstructural
breaks bias the tests toward accepting the null hypothesis. Indeed T > 100
is required to achieve a reasonable performance with respect to size and
1 More formally, the additional assumption for tests that requires T →∞are (i) Si →∞
and (ii) Si/T → λ with 0 <λ<1. These assumptions ensure that the number of time
periods tends to inﬁnity in both regimes.130 Review of World Economics 2005, Vol. 141 (1)
Table 1: Rejection Frequencies for Panel Unit Root Tests
Size (ρ = 1) Power (ρ = 0.9)
T LL IPS BREAK LL IPS BREAK
N = 5
20 0.0212 0.0166 0.0836 0.002 0.0162 0.2666
30 0.0188 0.0232 0.0680 0.000 0.0146 0.4320
50 0.0228 0.0346 0.0702 0.0098 0.1166 0.7234
100 0.0224 0.0388 0.0643 0.0188 0.5912 0.9864
N = 10
20 0.0198 0.0106 0.0858 0.0096 0.0142 0.3796
30 0.0204 0.0214 0.0694 0.0092 0.0492 0.6206
50 0.0138 0.0316 0.0651 0.0046 0.2084 0.9318
100 0.0196 0.0406 0.0593 0.0299 0.9204 0.9997
N = 20
20 0.0180 0.0058 0.0776 0.0064 0.0126 0.5402
30 0.0156 0.0172 0.0588 0.0062 0.0618 0.8514
50 0.0130 0.0280 0.0561 0.0052 0.3950 0.9967
100 0.0152 0.0386 0.0534 0.0692 0.9984 1.000
Note: Relative rejection frequencies based on 5,000 Monte Carlo replications of model
(5)–(7). The nominal size of the test is 0.05.
power of the IPS test. On the other hand, the test suggested in Section 2
performs quite well with respect to size and power.
Summing up, the results of this Monte Carlo experiment suggest that
ignoring a possible structural break is even more problematical than in the
case of single time series (Perron 1989).
4D a t a
To test the validity of the PPP in the long run, we consider ﬁve coun-
triesinSouthandLatinAmerica(Mexico,Venezuela,Colombia,Argentina,
and Brazil) and ﬁve Asian countries (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, South
Korea, and Hong Kong). The logarithms of the real exchange rates are pre-
sented in Figures 1 and 2. The choice of these countries is motivated by
several reasons. First, they have all experienced a tumultuous 1990s, char-
acterized by frequent changes in the nominal exchange rates and successfulBreitung/Candelon: Purchasing Power Parity during Currency Crises 131
Figure 1: Real Exchange Rates for South and Latin American Countries
speculative attacks. However, whereas Asian countries have experienced
longperiodsofﬂexibleexchangerates,SouthandLatinAmericancountries
have mainly pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar. It is thus interesting
t os e ew h e t h e rt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m eh a sa ni m p a c to nt h ea d j u s t m e n t
to the PPP relationship. Since under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime nomi-
nal exchange rates immediately reﬂect new information, PPP real exchange
rates tend to be quite variable. In contrast, under a ﬁxed regime, new in-
formation is reﬂected through prices and thus real exchange rates adjust
much more slowly thando nominal rates. The stability of the PPP relation-132 Review of World Economics 2005, Vol. 141 (1)
Figure 2: Real Exchange Rates for Asian Countries
ship may also provide information on the fundamental causes of the crises
and helps interpreting the crises when using different generations of crisis
models.
The data are monthly observations taken from the IFS data base. The
p r i c el e v e li sm e a s u r e db yt h eC o n s u m e rP r i c eI n d e xa n dt h ee x c h a n g er a t e
is expressed relative to the U.S. dollar.2 T h es a m p l ep e r i o d sg i v e ni nT a b l e2
2 In such a case, the choice of the numeraire currency is not so contradictory as in the
case of industrialized countries (Papell and Theodoridis 2000), because the U.S. dollar is
the trade currency for most of the emerging countries in our panel.Breitung/Candelon: Purchasing Power Parity during Currency Crises 133
Table 2: Dates of Financial Crises
Time span Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3
Mexico 1993:11–2001:7 95:1-3, 95:6 94:12-95:1, 95:3-4 94:12-95:1, 95:3,
95:11 95:11
Venezuela 1995:1–2001:7 96:6-8, 99:1-3 96:6 96:6, 99:1-2
Colombia 1998:9–2001:5 – – –
Argentina 1996:9–2001:6 – – –
Brazil 1981:1–2001:7 96:6-8, 99:1-2 96:6 96:6-9, 99:1-2
Thailand 1981:1–2001:7 84:11-12, 85:1, 84:11, 97:7, 84:11, 97:7,
97:8-98:1 97:12-98:3 97:12-98:1
Singapore 1981:1–2001:8 01:5-7 98:2, 01:5 01:5
Malaysia 1981:1–2001:8 97:9-98:1 97:8-98:2, 98:6-8 98:1
South Korea 1981:1–2001:8 97:9-11, 98:1-2 97:9-10 97:8-10
Hong Kong 1981:1–2001:8 – – –
Note: The dates are noted in the form year:months. All data are taken from the IFS data base.
The three criteria to determine currency crises are explained in the text.
areconstrainedbydataavailabilityandcover3–20yearsforSouthandLatin
American countries and 20 years for Asian countries.
Usually,currencycrisesaredetectedviaanabruptchangeinthenominal
exchange rates. In the literature two different approaches are used to date
these crises. Following Glick and Rose (1999), it is possible to rely on jour-
nalisticandacademichistoriesin ordertodeterminethecrisesperiods. The
second approach was introduced by Eichengreen et al. (1996),who identify
currencycrisesbymeansofameasureofspeculativepressure.3 Inourstudy,
we onlyfocus on successful speculative attacksthatresult in substantial dis-
tortions in real exchange rates (see also Esquivel and Larrain 1998). Thus,
the nominal depreciation occurring during high-inﬂation periods are not
labelled as “currency crises” in our study. In practice, as prices react slowly
toashockinnominalexchangerates,acurrencycrisisischaracterizedbyan
abruptchangeintherealexchangerate.Therefore,weconsiderthepresence
of a currency crisis as an extraordinary event, where the depreciation of the
real exchange rate exceeds some prespeciﬁed threshold. Hence, detection
of successful speculative attacks is equivalent to ﬁnding structural breaks
in the real exchange rate series. Obviously, there is some arbitrariness in
deﬁningthethresholdvalue.Choosingalargethresholdvalueimplies arisk
3 They note that a country may react to a speculative attack in three different ways: ad-




• Criterion 1: A crisis occurs if the 3-month accumulated change in the
real exchange rate is 15 percent or more. A similar criterion has been
applied by Esquivel and Larrain (1998). The choice of 15 percent is of
coursemoreorlessarbitrarybutseems toproducea reasonablenumber
of crisis periods.
• Criterion 2: A crisis is indicated if the one-month change in the real
exchange rate falls in the upper 0.5 percent of the distribution, i.e, it
exceeds 2.54 times the speciﬁc-country standard deviation. Such a cri-
terion has been used by Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Kaminsky et al.
(1998) among others.
• Criterion 3: Frankel and Rose (1996a) deﬁne a crash as an observation
where the nominal dollar exchange rate increases by at least 25 percent
in a year and has increased by at least 10 percent more than it did
in the previous year. Our criterion is somewhat less restrictive, as we
identify a currency crisis if the one-month change in the real exchange
rate exceeds 10 percent within one month.
Table 2 presents some information on the sample spans and the dates of
the currency crises, applying these three different criteria. It turns out that
the date of the crises are not completely identical when applying different
criteria.Italsoturnsoutthatcondition 2isthemostconservativedeﬁnition
of a currency crisis. This is not surprising as the standard deviation of the
real exchange rate incorporates the crisis period, which leads to a more
conservative deﬁnition of the crisis.
5 Results of the Unit Root Tests
To test the hypothesis that the real exchange rate is stationary in presence
of structural breaks, we ﬁrst run unit root tests separately for each country.
First,theADFtesthasbeen applied,wherethenumberoflaggeddifferences
isdeterminedbyapplyingtheAICcriterion.Second,wehaveincludedastep
and an impulse dummy to account for the period of the structural break
related to the currency crisis. The results of the tests arereported in Table 3.
The ADF tests cannot reject the unit root hypothesis at a signiﬁcance level
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(1989) this ﬁnding may be due to a structural break which may mask the
stationary behavior of the series. Indeed, if the test procedure accounts
for the structural break (Perron test), then the test statistics tend to be
substantiallylargerthantheADFstatistic, except forBrasil.Butstill thenull
hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at a 0.05 signiﬁcance level with
the exception of Thailand.4 The PPP hypothesis is thus not supported for
individual countries. Such a result is in line with the previous studies using
a time series approach.
Table 3: Univariate Unit Root Tests
AIC lag ADF Perron (crit. 1) Perron (crit. 2) Perron (crit. 3)
Mexico 1 –2.036 –2.211 –1.413 –3.031
Venezuela 1 –2.062 –2.431 –2.232 –2.096
Colombia 1 –0.520 –0.520 –0.520 –0.520
Argentina 2 –2.006 –2.006 –2.006 –2.006
Brazil 0 –2.083 –0.067 –0.099 –0.065
Thailand 8 –0.719 –3.850∗ –3.810∗ –3.899∗
Singapore 1 –0.893 –0.914 –1.038 –0.916
Malaysia 1 –1.597 –2.302 –2.048 –0.588
South Korea 8 –0.719 –2.738 –2.785 –2.376
Hong Kong 1 –1.326 –1.326 –1.326 –1.326
Note: The column “AIC lag” reports the optimal lag according to the Akaike criterion. “ADF”
indicates the augmented Dickey–Fuller test and “Perron” denotes the augmented Dickey–
Fuller test allowing for changes in the constant. ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level ac-
cording to the critical values reported by Perron (1989).
Inordertofurtherimprovethepoweroftheunitroottestweapplypanel
data unitroottests. First, conventionalpanel dataLL andIPSunitroottests
suggested by Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) are performed, which
ignore the structural breaks in the time series. The lag length is p = 1.5
4 Perron (1989) presents critical values for a single break only. However, as the critical
values increase with the number of structural breaks, it is clear that if we cannot reject the
unit root hypothesis with respect to Perron critical values, the result remains the same by
using the critical values according to multiple breaks. Therefore, a rejection of the null hy-
pothesis is possible only for Thailand. However, as there are at least 6 break periods (cri-
terion 2) for Thailand and the test statistics are close to the critical value reported for the
case of a single break, it is likely that the test statistics for Thailand are insigniﬁcant when
compared to the actual critical values accounting for 6 (or more) break periods.
5 The results are not sensitive to a change in the lag length.136 Review of World Economics 2005, Vol. 141 (1)
The LL test yields a test statistic of 0.636 and the IPS statistic is 1.087.
Comparedto thecriticalvalues(5percent:–1.645,10percent:–1.282)both
test statistics are not able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the
real exchange rates.
Table 4: Panel Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks
All countries S+L America Asia Asia without Thailand
Criterion 1 0.222 3.965 –1.847∗∗ –1.756∗∗
Criterion 2 0.206 2.865 –1.141 –1.241
Criterion 3 –0.105 3.285 –1.699∗∗ –1.451∗
Note: This table presents the test statistics for the panel unit root test accounting for struc-
tural breaks (Section 2) at the dates of the currency crises according to the criteria presented
in Section 4. ∗ (∗∗) indicates that the unit root hypothesis is rejected in favor of a stationary
process at the signiﬁcance level of 0.10 (0.05).
To account for structural breaks in the individual series we employ the
test procedure suggested in Section 2. Applying the test for all 10 countries
the tests yield insigniﬁcant test statistics according to the critical value of
−1.645 no matter of the deﬁnition of the crisis (Table 4).6 Therefore, there
is still no empirical support for a stable PPP relationship. However, if we
split the sample according to Asia and South and Latin America, the results
reveal interesting differences. The absence of PPP is conﬁrmed for South
and Latin American countries, whatever the deﬁnition of the crisis. In the
case of Asia, a unit root process is rejected at the 5 percent level, when
using criteria 1 and 3. The evidence of stationary real exchange rates is less
clear, using criterion 2, but it should be recalled that this criterion yields
the most conservative deﬁnition of the crisis. As the univariate unit root
tests with structural breaks yield some support for PPP in Thailand, the
results for Asia may be driven by a single country. We therefore leave out
Thailand and repeat the unit root tests. Indeed, the evidence for a long-run
PPP relationship becomes somewhat weaker but the unit root hypothesis
is still rejected for criterion 1 at the 5 percent level and for criterion 3 at
the 10 percent level. Summing up, we ﬁnd some support for a long-run
PPP relationship in Asia but not in South and Latin America. For the latter
6 In accordance with the usual information criteria, a lag order of one is considered in
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countries there is even evidence for an explosive behavior of real exchange
rates as the unit root statistics are signiﬁcantly positive. This result stresses
theimportanceoftheexchangerateregimefortherelevanceofthePPP.The
ﬂe xiblee x c hangerat eregimeallo wsforanadjustmentofnominale x c hange
rates, such that PPP tends to hold in the long run. It does not preclude
of course that the adjustments may be realized with a delay, leading to
a rejection of the short-run PPP. Such a result is not found when using the
traditional LL and IPS tests, perhaps due to the low power of the test in the
presence of structural breaks.
The previous results shed some light on the type of currency crises.
Usually, two different models are used to explain currency crises. The ﬁrst
generation model (see, e.g., Krugman 1979 and Flood and Garber 1984)
explains the currency crisis by a continuous deterioration in the economic
fundamentals. Later on, the economy eventually becomes the victim of
a speculative attack on its foreign exchange reserves, which triggers the
collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate system. In such a scenario, it is clear that
the real exchange rate deviates from unity, suggesting that PPP is violated
outside the crises periods. The second generation (e.g., Obstfeld 1996)
provides a different explanation of a currency crisis. This type of crises
occurs, for example, when the sheer pessimism of speculative investors
provokesacapitaloutﬂowthatleadstotheeventualcollapseoftheexchange
rate system. Poor macroeconomic fundamentals can of course encourage
speculative attacks on the currencies but are not a necessary condition
for their occurrence. Such a self-fulﬁlling crisis can initiate an accelerating
devaluationofthecurrencyfarawayfromitsmacroeconomicfundamentals.
In the case of Asian countries, the statistics are quite close to the 0.05
criticalvalueindicatingthatthesecountrieshavenotexperienced persistent
deviations of their real exchange rate from the implied PPP. This suggests
that the 1997 crisis ﬁts the second generation of currency crises models.
This result conﬁrms previous studies, stressing the self-fulﬁlling origins of
the Asian crises. Concerning the South and Latin American countries, the
statistics clearly indicate a nonstationary behavior of real exchange rates
for all lag lengths, whatever the deﬁnition of the crisis. The real exchange
rate was thus over- or undervalued before the crises, indicating a ﬁrst-
generationcrisis.Moreover,italsorevealsthatthereadjustmentofexchange
rates following the crisis (generally coupled with a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime)isnotsufﬁcienttorestorethelong-runPPP.Thiswouldindicatethat
external imbalances pertain in these countries in the aftermath of a crisis.
Of course, such results have to be conﬁrmed by deeper structural analysis.138 Review of World Economics 2005, Vol. 141 (1)
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, the empirical evidence of the long-run PPP relationship has
been studied for a panel of South and Latin American as well as Asian
countries. To test whether deviations from PPP are transitory, a new panel
unitroottesthasbeenappliedthatisrobusttostructuralbreaks.Ourresults
suggest that PPP is relevant for the Asian countries, which experienced
a ﬂexible exchange rate, whereas for South and Latin American currencies,
which have been pegged for a long time to the U.S. dollar, PPP is not
supported. This result stresses the role of the exchange rate regime for
the validity of the PPP paradigm. Furthermore, in Asian countries a long-
run PPP relationship appears to hold before the 1997 crisis, which is not
the case for the South and Latin American countries. This result provides
information on the type of currency crises: The “Asian ﬂu” corresponds
more to a second-generation type of crises, whereas the 1995 “Mexican
tequila” ﬁts the ﬁrst-generation models.
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